Russian Rule-Ette:  Using Khodorkovsky’s Criminal Trial to Asses the State of Russia’s Judiciary by Bernardelli, Dina M
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 4
12-1-2008
Russian Rule-Ette: Using Khodorkovsky’s Criminal
Trial to Asses the State of Russia’s Judiciary
Dina M. Bernardelli
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dina M. Bernardelli, Russian Rule-Ette: Using Khodorkovsky’s Criminal Trial to Asses the State of
Russia’s Judiciary , 31 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 85 (2008), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/
vol31/iss1/4
85 
RUSSIAN RULE-ETTE: USING  
KHODORKOVSKY’S CRIMINAL TRIAL TO 
ASSESS THE STATE OF RUSSIA’S JUDICIARY 
Dina M. Bernardelli* 
Abstract: The criminal trial of Russian oligarch and oil tycoon Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky in connection with Yukos Oil has been one of the most pub-
licized and controversial trials in the history of the Russian Federation. 
Khodorkovsky’s conviction in the Russian courts has raised grounds for 
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights on both procedural and 
substantive grounds. This Note discusses the failures of judicial reform in 
Russia since the founding of the Russian Federation that have been 
brought to light by Khodorkovsky’s trial, and assesses the causes of these 
failures and the prospects for judicial reform. 
Introduction 
 The controversial proceedings in the criminal case against former 
Yukos Oil executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky have put the judiciary of the 
Russian Federation in the spotlight.1 Although many feel that the 
charge and conviction of one of the nation’s youngest oligarchs was 
politically motivated, few doubt his guilt; what they do doubt is the 
process the State used to convict him.2 From the State’s utilization of 
unorthodox discovery methods to the deportation of his defense attor-
ney, potentially sabotaging his appeals process, the historic trial has left 
Russians and the international community wondering whether the Rus-
sian Federation met the due process burdens to which it is committed 
through its constitution and international treaties. 
 This Note first addresses the socio-political background of the 
rise and fall of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Part II discusses Russia’s case 
against Khodorkovsky and his opportunities for appeal in light of the 
international right of due process as set forth by the United Nations 
                                                                                                                      
* Dina Bernardelli is the Solicitations & Symposium Editor of the Boston College Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Review. The author would like to thank Professor Martha Merritt 
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1 See Artyom Liss, Yukos Trial Raises New Questions, BBC News, June 1, 2005, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4598239.stm. 
2 See id. 
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International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the laws of the Russian 
Federation. Finally, Part III looks at Khodorkovsky’s imminent appeal 
to the European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H.R.) as a litmus 
test for judicial reform in the Russian Federation as a whole, and ad-
dresses factors contributing to reform failure. 
I. Background 
 Mikhail Khodorkovsky had humble beginnings in a time of politi-
cal upheaval and rising economic opportunity in the Soviet Union.3 In 
1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist 
Party, putting him at the helm of the Soviet Union.4 Gorbachev sought 
to reform and revitalize the Communist Party by giving greater free-
dom to the Soviet people through glasnost (openness), and to jump-
start the economy through radical economic reforms known as pere-
stroika (restructuring) that ultimately permitted and encouraged pri-
vate ownership.5 It was during perestroika that entrepreneurs such as 
Khodorkovsky were able to build businesses in the service industry and 
take advantage of foreign investment.6 These radical reforms, however, 
signaled the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.7 
 The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, and Boris Yeltsin emerged 
from the tumult as the first democratically elected president of Rus-
sia.8 Yeltsin launched an aggressive privatization campaign, popularly 
referred to as “shock therapy,” to jolt the stagnant Russian economy 
into a capitalist market by divesting formerly lucrative state-run indus-
tries in public auctions.9 A combination of forces stemming from high 
inflation and investor uncertainty resulted in only a few bidders ob-
taining large holdings in lucrative industries such as energy and tele-
commincations from the state for minimal rates.10 The men who prof-
                                                                                                                      
3 Jeremy Scott-Joynt, Khodorkovsky: An Oligarch Undone, BBC News, May 31, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4482203.stm. 
4 Mary McAuley, Soviet Politics 1917–1991 87 (1992). 
5 See id. at 90–91. 
6 See David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia 
116–18 (2002). 
7 See McAuley, supra note 4, at 95. 
8 Id. at 110. 
9 See Nicholas Spulber, Russia’s Economic Transitions 303–04, 309 (2003). 
10 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 40. Khodorkovksy, recalling the vast opportunities and 
the limited population taking advantage of them during privatization, stated: 
I talked with people and asked them, why didn’t you start doing the same 
thing? Why didn’t you go into it? Because any head of an institute had more 
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ited most from privatization became known as the Russian oligarchs.11 
They had the connections, capital, and confidence to take advantage 
of the sale of state enterprises in the early and mid 1990s.12 The con-
centration of so much wealth and media control in the hands of so 
few also gave these men political power.13 Yeltsin, in need of support 
as leader of the new Russian Federation, bargained with the oligarchs 
for their monetary and political support to stave off competing parties 
from overturning the young democratic government.14 After Yeltsin 
was re-elected in 1996, the oligarchs in turn received economic incen-
tives and influence over government policies as appointees to posi-
tions in the Kremlin.15 
 During this time, Khodorkovsky used his political connections and 
capital generated from earlier privatization endeavors to purchase 
Yukos Oil, the first fully privatized oil company in Russia, at the ex-
tremely low cost of $300 million.16 He was now in control of the second-
largest oil company in what was the leading oil producing country in 
the world.17 Khodorkovsky also acquired political power by supporting 
President Boris Yeltsin, becoming his Deputy Fuel and Oil Minister.18 
His wealth and the support of the Kremlin made Khodorkovsky the 
model oligarch.19 
 In the late 1990s, Khodorkovsky’s role began to change.20 No 
longer the strong, silent supporter of the Kremlin, he began making 
                                                                                                                      
possibilities than I had, by an order of magnitude. They explained that they 
had all gone through the period—the Kosygin thaw—when the same self-
financing system was allowed. And then, at best, people were unable to suc-
ceed in their career and, at worst, found themselves in jail. They were all sure 
that would be the case this time, and that is why they did not go into it. And 
I—I did not remember this! I was too young! And I went for it. 
Id. at 107. 
11 See id. at 4–7. “Oligarch” was a term used to represent their elite status as the ruling 
few who used their wealth and control of the media to gain great political power. See id.; 
Spulber, supra note 9, at 311. 
12 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 4–7. 
13 See Spulber, supra note 9, at 311; Scott-Joynt, supra note 3. 
14 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 324; Spulber, supra note 9, at 311. 
15 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 358–62. These incentives included opportunities to 
buy shares of state industries before their initial public offering and government invest-
ment in their private businesses, which provided the capital necessary for expansion. See id. 
16 See id. at 205; see also Scot-Joynt, supra note 3 (noting that Yukos, at height of its 
wealth, was valued at $20 billion). 
17 Hurbert B. Herring, Who Produces the Most Oil? Not Who You Think, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
17, 2006, at 3–2 (noting that Russia topped Saudi Arabia in at least the first half of 2006). 
18 Scott-Joynt, supra note 3. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
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public donations to diverse Russian political parties.21 He also 
planned to run for a seat in the lower house of the State Duma in 
Moscow in December 2005—a move made impossible by his impris-
onment.22 President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 and the politi-
cal inactivity of many of the oligarchs coupled with the imprisonment 
of Khodorkovsky during his time in office have many in Russia and 
abroad questioning the lengths to which he would go to eliminate any 
political opposition from this privileged class.23 
 In October 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of em-
bezzlement, tax evasion, and fraud.24 The investigation into Yukos fi-
nances occurred amidst Khodorkovsky’s opposition to proposed tax 
hikes on Russian oil companies.25 A State review of the same books 
they had approved the year before resulted in $3 billion in back-taxes 
and fines for one year alone.26 Khodorkovsky has been found guilty 
on all but one charge, but many Russians believe that an oligarch not 
guilty of economic crimes would be the exception to the rule.27 Fur-
thermore, Khodorkovsky’s recent political aspirations cause concern 
as to whether the trial and convictions were politically motivated.28 A 
study of Khodorkovsky’s criminal trial may give insight to judicial in-
dependence in post-communist Russia by examining the validity of 
alleged violations in the Eur. Ct. H.R. and whether the violations, or 
lack thereof, mark judicial reform compared to past violation of due 
process that have reached the Court.29 
II. Discussion 
 Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been tried and convicted of violating 
six articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.30 The first 
                                                                                                                      
21 See id. 
22 Court Rejects Khodorkovsky Appeal, BBC News, Sept. 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/business/4270718.stm. 
23 See Taming the Robber Barons, Economist, May 22, 2004, at 5. 
24 Court Rejects Khodorkovsky Appeal, supra note 22; Yukos: Has a Deal Been Done?, Times 
Online (U.K.) (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1-
1055668,00.html. 
25 Yukos: Has a Deal been Done?, supra note 24. 
26 Marsha Lipman, The Taming of a Tycoon—and of Russia, Wash. Post, June 16, 2004, 
at A27. 
27 See Liss, supra note 1. 
28 See Court Rejects Khodorkovsky Appeal, supra note 22. 
29 See Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights 774–
75 (2d ed. 2005). 
30 Id.; see Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] arts. 160, 165(3), 198(2), 199(2), 
199(3), 315 (Russ.). 
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three counts relate to the acquisition of Apatit, a bankrupt fertilizer 
company, from the State in 1994 during privatization.31 Apatit was 
sold at a reduced price, but with performance conditions attached as 
part of the contract of sale.32 The buyer was to invest $283 million in 
developing Apatit in the remote town of Kirovsk and in the town itself 
over a period of two years in exchange for future stock options in the 
company.33  Kohodorkovsky never satisfied these conditions, however, 
and was found guilty of grand theft of property by an organized 
criminal group.34 
 Apatit engaged in successful international business from 2000–
2002, but operated with little profit because the company would sell 
fertilizer at greatly reduced rates to international buyers who would 
then re-sell the product at twice the price.35 The government found 
that this caused Russian national investors, including the State, to lose 
proceeds paid in the form of shareholder dividends, and Khodork-
ovsky was found guilty of damage to assets through fraud committed 
by an organized criminal group.36 This was not the first time the 
breach of the Apatit contract had reached Russian courts.37 In No-
vember 2002, Khodorkovsky and his business partners settled the dis-
pute with the State for a sum based on estimates of Apatit’s value.38 
The State found that these estimates were based on misleading and 
unreliable data.39 Khodorkovsky was held accountable for submitting 
the unreliable and undervalued assessments of Apatit’s worth and 
charged with malicious non-compliance with a court ruling by repre-
sentatives of a commercial organization.40 
 Khodorkovsky was also convicted on three violations related to 
his involvement with Yukos.41 He was found guilty of multiple counts 
of conspiracy to evade corporate tax obligations by an organized 
                                                                                                                      
31 See Peter L. Clateman, Summary and Analysis of Report on Criminal Case #18/41-03, 
Dec. 10, 2003, at 3–7, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/indictment.pdf. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 UK art. 159(3); see Peter L. Clateman, Clateman: Review of the Criminal Sentence and 
Appeal, Mar. 29, 2006, at 1–2, 6, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/Yukos-VII-Sentence-
and-Appeal.pdf. 
35 See Clateman, supra note 34, at 13. 
36 UK art. 165(3); See Clateman, supra note 314, at 1–2, 13. 
37 See Clateman, supra note 31, at 6–7. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 7. 
40 UK art. 315; see Clateman, supra note 31, at 1–2. 
41 See Clateman, supra note 31, at 1–2. 
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group.42 This included involvement in a tax evasion scheme by creat-
ing dummy entities with preferred tax status, and payment of these 
taxes with corporate bonds instead of cash to avoid further taxation.43 
In some areas, Yukos did not pay its taxes in cash as required by the 
Tax Code, but rather paid local officials in the form of promissory 
notes.44 Yukos then filed for tax refunds on these payments—another 
form of tax evasion.45 Additionally, Khodorkovsky was convicted on 
charges of embezzlement of property for siphoning over 2.5 billion 
rubles from various Yukos corporate accounts.46 
 Finally, Khodorkovsky was convicted of evasion of personal tax 
and social security obligations by an individual.47 The Russian tax sys-
tem allows for simplified filing and lower taxes for small entrepreneu-
rial businesses.48 Khodorkovsky attempted to claim salary and other 
benefits paid by Yukos and other companies as income derived from 
“independent entrepreneurial activity” by drafting private consulting 
contracts with off-shore entities of businesses he already owned.49 This 
structure allowed him to take advantage of the simplified tax system 
and qualified him for tax breaks that he was not legally due during 
1998 and 1999.50 
 Khodorkovsky was arrested in October 2003 and detained as a 
flight risk without bail on charges of embezzlement, fraud, and tax 
evasion until his sentencing in May 2005.51 His trial, which began in 
June 2004, lasted for eleven months and culminated with the reading 
of a 600-plus page sentence over the course of twelve days in Judge 
Irina Kolesnikova’s Meschansky District Court.52 Khodorkovsky was 
sentenced to nine years imprisonment—only one year under the 
maximum penalty for these offenses.53 If unsuccessful in his appeals, 
                                                                                                                      
42 UK art. 199(2). 
43 Id. art. 199(3); see Clateman, supra note 31, at 16–18. 
44 See Clateman, supra note 31, at 16–18. 
45 UK art. 199(2); see Clateman, supra note 31, at 16–18. 
46 See Clateman, supra note 31, at 19. See generally UK art. 160 (enumerating criminal 
violations and their penalties). 
47 UK art. 198(2); see Clateman, supra note 31, at 1–2. 
48 See Clateman, supra note 31, at 14. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Court Rejects Khodorkovsky Appeal, supra note 22. 
52 See Clateman, supra note 31, at 1; Liss, supra note 1. 
53 See Court Rejects Khodorkovsky Appeal, supra note 22; see also Gennady Danilenko & 
William Burnham, Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation 498 (2d ed. 
2000) (detailing that in the Russian Federation, “Minor Crimes” are punishable by up to 
two years in prison, “Moderately Serious Crimes” are punishable up to five years in prison, 
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Khodorkovsky will serve seven and a half years in a medium-security 
Siberian prison.54 
 Khodorkovsky’s trial team brings to the forefront alleged civil 
rights violations, claiming that “Mr. Khodorkovsky, and those caught 
up in the campaign against him, have been denied due process in 
every sense of the word,” under both Russian and international stan-
dards.55 First, Khodorkovsky contends that the State’s October 2003 
search of defense attorney Anton Drel’s office, the seizure of materi-
als therein related to Yukos, and Drel’s summons for questioning by 
the Prosecutor General were in violation of attorney-client privilege 
and a breach of the rules of advocacy.56 Second, Khodorkovksy’s pre-
trial detention from October 2003 through the end of his trial in 2005 
was arbitrary and a sign of presumption of guilt before trial.57 Finally, 
Khodorkovksy argues that the State engaged in improper search 
methods including searching without a warrant and in the absence of 
parties subject to the search.58 
 These alleged due process violations have support in both the 
laws of the Russian Federation and international law.59 The Russian 
Federation is a party to the CCPR and the Council of Europe Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
                                                                                                                      
“Serious Crimes” are punishable up to ten years in prison, and “Very Serious Crimes” are 
punishable by over ten years in prison to life or even death). 
54 See Yukos Ex-Chief Jailed for 9 Years, BBC News, May 31, 2005, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/business/4595289.stm. Khodorkovsky’s total stay in prison reflects the nine year 
sentence less the time spent in state detention before trial. Id. 
55 Robert Amsterdam & Charles Krause, Constitutional and Due Process Violations in the 
Khodorkovsky/Yukos Case: A White Paper Prepared on Behalf of Mikhail Khodorkovksy, Platon Lebe-
dev, & Alexei Pichugin 1 (2005), available at http://www.khodorkovsky.info/docs/ 
133826__Download_the_YUKOS_White_Paper.pdf [hereinafter White Paper]. 
56 Id. at 2. 
57 See id. at 3. 
58 Id. 
59 See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15(4) 
(Russ.) stating: 
The universally recognized principles and norms of the international law and 
the international treaties of the Russian Federation are a component part of 
its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates 
other rules than those established by the law, the rules of the international 
treaty shall apply. 
Id.; see also Alexander Severance, Note, Old Habits Die Hard: Aleksandr Nikitin, the European 
Court of Human Rights, and Criminal Procedure in the Russian Federation, 25 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 177, 185 (2002) (providing background and illustrations of interplay be-
tween Russian Constitution and the then newly-adopted international treaty obligations). 
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(ECPF).60 Thus Khodorkovsky’s civil rights are protected not only by 
the Russian Constitution and Russian Criminal Procedure Code, but 
may also be appealed to the Eur. Ct. H.R., which has jurisdiction un-
der ECPF.61 His case may also be reviewed by the United Nations for 
human rights violations.62 The State must meet the due process stan-
dards set forth by these international bodies insofar as they differ 
from the laws of the Russian Federation.63 
 Chapter 13 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure protects 
against arbitrary detention.64 A suspect may be placed in pre-trial de-
tention if there are sufficient grounds to believe that the accused will 
flee, continue the criminal activity, threaten witnesses or participants, 
or destroy evidence or interfere with proceedings on the criminal case 
in any other way.65 Any measure of pre-trial restraint of a suspect must 
be a matter of “exceptional circumstances.”66 Full pre-trial detention 
is only available for those accused of committing a crime that carries a 
sentence longer than two years, and can only be imposed by a judge 
after reviewing a request from the prosecutor or investigation officer 
specifying the circumstances that have rendered other measures of 
restraint impossible.67 Khodorkovsky argues that no such “exceptional 
circumstances” existed to warrant full detention, the harshest restric-
tion.68 Furthermore, in his appeal, or cassation, to the Moscow City 
Court, Khodorkovsky stated that he was illegally held before trial be-
cause his detention was not motivated by a court decision and thus 
could not exceed two months.69 Even if the extension was authorized 
by a judge, Khodorkovksy’s nineteen month detention from October 
2003 until May 2005 is illegal under article 109 of the Russian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, which allows extensions of detention over one 
year, but not exceeding eighteen months, if sought with the consent 
                                                                                                                      
60 See generally Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 1949 Europ. T.S. No. 1 
(listing Russia as a member State and listing obligations of member States). 
61 European Convention for the Protection of Human and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECPF]. 
62 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Mar. 23, 1976, 1 
U.N.T.S. 999 [hereinafter CCPR]. 
63 Konst. RF art. 15(4). 
64 See generally Ugolovno-Protsessual’nyi Kodeks [UPK][Criminal Procedure Code] art. 
13 (Russ.) (prohibiting arbitrary detention). 
65 Id. art. 97. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. art. 108. 
68 See White Paper, supra note 55, at 9. 
69 Id.; see UPK art. 109(1). 
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of the Procurator General in “exceptional cases” involving “serious or 
very serious offenses.”70 
 Article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays out the 
grounds and procedures for making a search.71 All searches of living 
quarters must be done with the authority of a court decision and 
should be executed with an idea of what is being searched for, and 
probable cause to believe that the item(s) may be there.72 An exami-
nation or search and seizure may be performed without a judicial de-
cision only in exceptional cases in which the search cannot be de-
layed.73 In such situations, however, a judge must rule on the legality 
of the search within twenty-four hours of its commencement.74 If the 
search is found to have been illegal, all evidence obtained during the 
investigation is inadmissible.75 Khodorkovksy argues that the searches 
made of defense attorney Drel’s office, the seizure of documents 
within, as well as the search and seizure of evidence from Yukos’ of-
fices may have been concluded without a warrant and should have the 
protection of article 182.76 
 The Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that “arrest, 
detention, and retention in custody are admissible only on the basis of 
a court order,” and gives teeth to Khodorkovsky’s protests against his 
pre-trial detention.77 Without a court order, a person may not be de-
tained for a period of more than forty-eight hours.78 Additionally, any 
suspect or defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.79 
 The Russian Constitution also protects attorney-client privilege 
and the rules of advocacy.80 The interrogation of defense attorney An-
ton Drel and search and seizure of documents from his office was in 
direct violation of article 56(3), which forbids interrogating an advo-
cate about facts obtained during his representation of clients in 
criminal proceedings.81 As an attorney for Anton Lebdev in his role 
                                                                                                                      
70 White Paper, supra note 55, at 9. 
71 UPK art. 182. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. art. 165. 
76 See White Paper, supra note 55, at 3. 
77 Konst. RF art. 22(2). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. art. 49. 
80 Id. art. 56(3). 
81 Id. 
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with Yukos, Drel acquired knowledge about Khodorkovsky’s criminal 
trial to which he would not otherwise have had access.82 
 The Eur. Ct. H.R. also lays out standards for pre-trial detention and 
search and seizure.83 Anyone who has been lawfully detained is to be 
brought promptly before a judge and is entitled to either trial within a 
reasonable time or release pending trial.84 The right to a fair trial in-
cludes the right to a public hearing with few exceptions and the pre-
sumption of innocence.85 
 Khodorkovsky’s claims may be addressed through the Russian ap-
peals process.86 Within ten days of the ruling issued by the Mesh-
chansky District Court, Khodorkovsky filed his first cassation to the Mos-
cow City Court in accordance with articles 354–56 of the Russian Code 
of Criminal Procedure.87 The Moscow City Court must begin review of 
the case within one month and can uphold the ruling of the District 
Court or overturn the ruling by complete dismissal of charges, change 
of the sentence, or initiation of a new trial.88 If the District Court’s rul-
ing is upheld, it achieves official legal status the moment the decision is 
announced in the Moscow City Court, making the sentence immedi-
ately enforceable.89 Khodorkovsky’s cassation was brought before the 
Moscow City Court, and after only an hour of deliberation the 600-page 
sentence was upheld.90 Either party may at any time appeal the Moscow 
City Court’s ruling by requesting a supervisory review with the Presid-
ium of the Moscow City Court.91 These requests are reviewed by a court-
appointed Judge Rapporteur who will review the case and recommend to 
the Presidium whether the case should be reviewed.92 If supervisory 
review is denied, or if the review is granted and the earlier ruling up-
held, either party may appeal the decision to the Chair of the Moscow 
City Court within one year.93 
                                                                                                                      
82 See White Paper, supra note 55, at 2. 
83 ECPF, supra note 61, arts. 5, 6, 8. 
84 Id. art. 5(3). 
85 See id. art. 6(1). 
86 UPK arts. 354–356. 
87 Id.; Court Rejects Khodorkovsky Appeal, supra note 22. 
88 Press Center for Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Appeals: Russian Appeals Process , available at 
http://www.mbktrial.com/updates/appeals/appeals_overview.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 
2008) [hereinafter Appeals: Russian Appeals Process]. 
89 UPK art. 391. 
90 Clateman, supra note 31, at 1; Khodorkovsky in European Appeal, BBC News, Sept. 23, 
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4274742.stm. 
91 Appeals: Russian Appeals Process, supra note 88. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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 Although there is one higher court, the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation, for many cases an appeal to the Chair ends the 
process, exhausting intra-state legal remedies.94 A case will only be 
heard by the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of a hearing 
by the Judge Rapporteur and a decision by the Presidium of the Moscow 
City Court accepting the recommendation.95 If the Supreme Court 
reviews the case and upholds the lower court decisions, a final appeal 
may be made to the Presidium of the Supreme Court.96 Khodorkovsky 
will be serving his term in prison during the entire appeals process.97 
 Khodorkovksy is not limited to the Russian legal system, and his 
claims that the Russian authorities “violated several articles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights” may be directed to the Eur. 
Ct. H.R.98 Appeals to this court must be raised within six months of 
the final domestic ruling, and will only be considered after all domes-
tic remedies have been exhausted.99 The Eur. Ct. H.R. will not accept 
applications that are substantially related to decisions already made in 
the Eur. Ct. H.R. with no new information, claims that are ill-founded, 
or any application that has already been submitted to another inter-
national resolution mechanism without new information.100 The pro-
cedure includes submission and acceptance of an application, com-
munication to the respondent state, submissions of observations by 
both parties, an admissibility hearing, supplementary observations, 
and a hearing on the merits.101 In addition to the facts of the case, the 
procedural history, and the observations submitted by the applicant 
and respondent state, the Eur. Ct. H.R. will often also accept supple-
mentary submissions from independent sources and NGOs.102 
                                                                                                                      
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Appeals: Russian Appeals Process, supra note 88. 
97 See Yukos Ex-Chief Jailed for 9 Years, supra note 54. 
98 Konst. RF art. 46(3) (“Everyone in conformity with the international treaties of the 
Russian Federation has the right to turn to international organs concerned with the pro-
tection of human rights and freedoms if all the means of legal protection available within 
the state have been exhausted.”); see ECPF, supra note 61, art. 34; Khodorkovsky in European 
Appeal, supra note 90. 
99 ECPF, supra note 61, art. 35(1). 
100 See Leach, supra note 29, at 153. 
101 ECPF, supra note 61, arts. 31–46. 
102 Leach, supra note 29, at 64. 
96 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:85 
III. Analysis 
 The review of Khodorkovsky’s appeal to the Eur. Ct. H.R. may be 
an important indication of the success of judicial reform in the Russian 
Federation.103 Although Khodorkovsky has avenues of appeal through 
both the Eur. Ct. H.R. and the United Nations, the former has more 
case law regarding violations of due process in criminal trials by mem-
ber states.104 
 Through the ECPF and case law, the Eur. Ct. H.R. has created a 
positive obligation for States to grant detainees bail unless there are 
public interest grounds justifying their continued pre-trial detention 
under article 5(3).105 Persisting suspicion that the person arrested has 
committed an offense is a condition for the lawfulness of the deten-
tion, but after a certain lapse of time suspicion alone no longer suf-
fices.106 Grounds must be relevant, sufficient, and the court “must also 
be satisfied that the national authorities displayed ‘special diligence’ 
in investigating the continued need for withholding bail set out in 
their decisions on the application for release.”107 
 Mikhail Khodorkovsky was detained without bail for nineteen 
months from the time of his arrest until his conviction.108 He claims 
that the domestic court did not document the factors and reasoning 
supporting his detention.109 Furthermore, although the domestic court 
considered Khodorkovsky a flight risk, there are less severe methods of 
detention under Russian law, such as house arrest, that could have 
equally prevented this risk.110 The Eur. Ct. H.R. would likely find 
Khodorkovsky’s pre-trial detention unreasonable under article 5(3) 
because the domestic court did not meet its burden of demonstrating 
the relevance of Khodorkovsky’s detention or diligent investigation 
showing the dangers to public policy that would be posed by his re-
lease.111 
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 The Eur. Ct. H.R. preserves the right to a fair and public trial as an 
essential civil right in article 6.112 A trial must be conducted in public 
unless special interests such as public order, national security, or cir-
cumstances where publicity may “prejudice the interests of justice” ex-
ist.113 In reviewing if the domestic court met its burden of providing a 
fair hearing, the Eur. Ct. H.R. looks at whether the proceedings as a 
whole were fair, rather than focusing only on whether the formal re-
quirements set out in domestic law were met.114 The Eur. Ct. H.R. will 
readily regulate the preservation of the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to silence, equality of access and question-
ing for both prosecution and defense, and the right to a hearing within 
a reasonable time.115 The areas of admissibility of evidence and the 
right to a public hearing and judgment, conversely, are seen primarily 
as areas for domestic regulation and will only be viewed as part of the 
overall trial.116 Where the Eur. Ct. H.R. finds that the right to a fair 
hearing has been violated, it increasingly recommends that the domes-
tic proceedings be re-opened.117 
 Khodorkovsky has alleged that the State used evidence rendered 
inadmissible because of its means of collection.118 The Eur. Ct. H.R. 
sees this as a matter of domestic law and will not issue a ruling on the 
use of inadmissible evidence, but rather will consider it in its assess-
ment of the totality of the elements of the trial.119 An overall analysis 
of the fairness of the trial, therefore, must take into consideration 
whether the State has violated its own laws, resulting in an unfair ad-
vantage over the defense.120 The forceful deportation of one of 
Khodorkovsky’s defense attorneys, Robert Amsterdam, from Russia 
may also factor into the Eur. Ct. H.R.’s review of the overall fairness of 
the proceedings as a violation of article 6(3).121 This is not likely, how-
ever, to be a substantial factor in the totality test because the deporta-
tion occurred after the trial and only affects the appeals process.122 
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 Khodorkovsky’s case does not demonstrate significant improve-
ment in the preservation of human rights by the judiciary, but it does 
mark a more independent, less politicized judiciary than when Putin 
came to power in 2000.123 In the 1998 case Kalashnikov v. Russia, the 
Eur. Ct. H.R. struck down as unreasonable a four-year pretrial deten-
tion without bail for an appellant who had obstructed the investigation 
into his alleged criminal conduct of misappropriating a large number 
of shares in his role as the president of a bank.124 The court ruled that 
after evidence had been collected, there was no relevant reason for de-
nying the plaintiff bail, and therefore insufficient grounds for contin-
ued pre-trial detention.125  The Eur. Ct. H.R. was hopeful that the new 
Code of Criminal Procedure would put an end to most article 5 and 
article 6 claims.126 The Code provides for more specificity as to when 
pre-trial detention is allowed, the length of detention, and timetables to 
achieve speedy trial and appeals.127 Despite the implementation of the 
Code, however, the Eur. Ct. H.R. continues to receive applications for 
due process violations under article 6 at rates similar to other states that 
have not undergone recent reform in this area.128 
 The State also has not had significant improvement in preventing 
unlawful pre-trial detention under article 5 since the 2001 case of Gus-
inskiy v. Russia.129 Some important distinctions, however, may be made 
between Khodorkovsky’s allegations and Gusinskiy, which indicate im-
provement in the independence of the judiciary.130 Although the State 
may have violated Khodorkovsky’s civil rights by not composing a for-
mal opinion regarding his pre-trial detention and therefore not show-
ing how it was reasonable, this failure in procedure stands in sharp con-
trast to the substantive failures of the judiciary to operate justly and 
independently from political pressures in Gusinskiy.131 Vladimir Gusin-
                                                                                                                      
123 See, e.g., Gusinskiy v. Russia, App. No. 70276/01, 2004–IV Eur. Ct. H.R.; Kalashnikov 
v. Russia, 2002–IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 93. 
124 Kalashnikov, 2002–IV Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 114–118. 
125 Mowbray, supra note 105, at 81. 
126 Leach, supra note 29, at 774–75. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 455. 
129 See generally Gusinskiy, 2004–IV Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 73–78 (finding Russia in viola-
tion of article 18 in conjunction with article 5). 
130 See generally id. at ¶¶ 9–44 (detailing Gusinskiy’s arrest, detenion, and trial); White 
Paper, supra note 55. 
131 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 476–82. The former media mogul and oligarch 
Vladimir Gusinskiy owed a significant debt to the state-owned Gazprom. The debt had 
been negotiated under the Yeltsin Administration as a reward for political support through 
his television stations and newspapers. Under Putin Administration, however, the govern-
 
2008] Khodorkovsky and Judicial Reform in Russia 99 
sky was a fellow oligarch detained by the Russian authorities in 2000 on 
charges of fraud.132 Authorities arrested Gusinsky and used his deten-
tion and charges against him to coerce him to sign away his media 
company to secure his freedom.133 The Eur. Ct. H.R. found that Russia 
had violated article 5 by detaining Gusinsky for a reason other than or 
in addition to committing a crime.134 
 According to a 2002 national survey of the Russian Federation “an 
overwhelming majority of Russians do not think that they live under a 
rule-of-law state.”135 In Russian society, a common view seems to be that 
Khodorkovsky may be guilty of the criminal charges brought against 
him, but that he is a political prisoner because he alone among the oli-
garchs has been held accountable for his crimes.136 This, however, is 
partly mistaken since Khodorkovsky is only one of a number of the oli-
garchs the Kremlin has sought to investigate for criminal activities.137 
Furthermore, although Khodorkovsky received nearly the most severe 
sentence for crimes of this nature, such severity is on par with contem-
porary sentencing of economic crimes in the United States.138 
 What, then, contributes to this view of a politically motivated judi-
ciary and why does judicial reform fail? The ineffectiveness of judicial 
reform in Russia is largely the product of a young democracy, the gap 
between codified law and its implementation, and corruption in law 
enforcement bodies.139 
 The Russian Federation is still a young democracy.140 The rapid 
change from communism, much like the rapid “shock therapy” eco-
                                                                                                                      
ment decided to collect on this debt, attempting to bankrupt Gusinskiy and force him to 
sign over Media-Most conglomerate to Gazprom. See id. 
132 Id. at 479. 
133 Id. at 477, 482–83. 
134 Gusinskiy, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶ 73–78. 
135 Richard Rose, Neil Monroe & William Mishler, Resigned Acceptance of an Incomplete 
Democracy: Russia’s Political Equilibrium, 20 Post-Soviet Aff. 195, 200 (2004). 
136 See Court Rejects Khordorkovsky’s Appeal, supra note 22; Hugh Fraser, Russia’s Oligarchs: 
Their Risky Routes to Riches, BBC News, July 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/busi-
ness/3927523.stm. 
137 See Spulber, supra note 9, at 313. 
138 See Carrie Johnson, End of Enron’s Saga Brings Era to a Close: Corporate Crime Enforce-
ment Shifts Focus, Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 2006, at D1. In September 2006, former Enron CEO 
Jeffry Skilling was sentenced to twenty-five years for fraud and conspiracy leading to the 
company’s collapse. Bernard Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom, is serving twenty-five 
years for securities fraud—a virtual life sentence for the sixty-six year old southern tycoon. 
See id. 
139 See M.C. Mirow, Latin American Law 235–37 (2004); Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for 
Rule of Law in Russia, 37 Geo. J. Int’l L. 353, 392–94 (2006). 
140 See McAuley, supra note 4, at 95. 
100 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:85 
nomic transition, instantly laid a new, democratic ideology over a soci-
ety that had for the greater part of a century operated as a communist 
state.141 The all-controlling executive of the Soviet system created an 
enduring perception of the judiciary as politically influenced, even as 
the new government and constitution were implemented.142 In 
Khodorkovsky’s case, this lapse of perception of the transition to de-
mocracy strongly biases the people against the political independence 
of the court when prosecuting high-profile officials.143 
 How the judicial system is perceived by the people and local gov-
ernments plays a part in the effectiveness of its actual enforcement.144 
Where citizens do not have faith in the rule of law, as in Russia, courts 
and their adjudication of the law lose legitimacy.145 This creates a gap 
between the written law and its actual practice within the State.146 The 
inability to enforce laws exacerbates this problem, reducing the incen-
tive of the public to play by the rules set in written law.147 The failure 
to follow the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Khodorkovsky case, 
regardless of the findings in the Eur. Ct. H.R., cuts at the legitimacy of 
the court.148 When the State does not enforce its own laws, especially 
in a highly-publicized case, people lose trust that they will be pro-
tected by the laws of the court, and lower courts receive the message 
that enforcement of the written law is only partly necessary.149 
 Finally, corruption in the legal system undermines the ability of 
the judiciary to prosecute criminals.150 In a recent scandal known as 
“Three Wales” it was revealed that President Putin’s efforts to stop eco-
nomic crimes have, in part, been thwarted from within.151 The Prosecu-
tor General’s office announced the recent dismissal and investigation 
of high-ranking officials in offices related to economic regulation 
throughout Russia for their involvement in suppressing a case in 2000 
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against high profile businessmen.152 This demonstrates that the effec-
tiveness of the judiciary may still be elusive because deep-seated cor-
ruption in investigation and law enforcement impedes the develop-
ment of a strong rule of law.153 
Conclusion 
 Khodorkovsky’s criminal trial highlights Russia’s lack of judicial 
reform since the fallout of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 
a democratic form of government. In comparing Khodorkovsky’s case 
to other Russian cases that have come before the Eur. Ct. H.R., it is 
apparent that although there are improvements in the separation of 
the judiciary from the executive, the State still violates the right of 
due process. This stagnation in judicial reform is the product of a 
young democracy still working against the deep roots of the former 
Soviet culture, the gap between codified law and its implementation, 
and corruption in law enforcement bodies—three factors which must 
be addressed for improvements to take hold. 
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